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Jeff West and Annette McGrew

Brian Connors-Manke

Intellectual Independence:
lslamism and the Decentering of Europe:
disC/osure interviews S. Sayyid

Crosses

Dr. S. Sayyid is a University Research Fellow at the University of Leeds
in Britain and author of the book, A F1111da1J1ental Fear: E11rocentris1J1 and
the Emerg,ence of Is!aJJJism (1997, Zed Books). His research explores
questions concerning the politicization of Islam, the production of
cultural identities, and the use of discursive methodologies to analyze
structures of social po~ver. He visited the University of l(entucky in
February 2004 as part of the Spring Seminar and Lecture Series on
Religion and Identity sponsored by the Ul( Committee on Social
Theory and presented a lecture entitled 'Postcolonial Politics and
Islam(ism).' Following the lecture, Dr. Sayyid sat down with members
of disC/os11re's editorial collective to discuss some of the issues raised in
his lecture and their entanglement with current events such as the
United States' invasion of Iraq and its global pursuit of the 'War on
Terror.' In the interview below, Sayyid presents his views on the
differences between Islamism and Islamization, the competing claims
of science and the Divine to authority within the Islamic state, and the
decline of Eurocentrism manifested in the political ideology of Iran's
Ayatollah I<homeini.

disClosure: What is it exactly that defines Islamism as a socio-political
entity?
S. Sayyid: Islamism is not a specific ideology in the sense of closed
system of beliefs, values and practices. Islamism is a discourse that
seeks to re-center Islam within the public realm of Muslim
communities. Islamism emerges in the context of a de facto (and often
de jure) displacement of Islam from the public to the private sphere. In
the wake of this displacement, Islamism seeks to re-center Islam within
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Muslim communities. Thus, Islamists wish to see social relations reorganized around the signifier of Islam. Islamists are committed to, they
would argue, the re-politicization of Islam. This (re-) politicization arises
from their opposition to the prevailing order in Muslim communities an.d
their desire to institute a new foundation for society. Of course, there is
great deal of diversity to be found among Isl~st~ reflecting l~cal
contexts and specific historical trajectories. Such diversity, however, is a
feature of all political discourses. For example, there are many
differences between social democracy in Germany and social democracy
in Spain, but these differences do not invalidate the existence of social
democracy per se. Thus, to observe differences between Sayyid Qutb
and I<homeini or Mawdudi and Ali Shariati does not put into question
the unity of Islamism as a phenomenon.
It is useful to distinguish (analytically at least) Islarnization from
Islamism. Islamization is a strategy that emerges in the context of
Islamism. Islamization is based on the blurring of frontiers between
those who want to see Islam in public affairs and those who attempt to
deny it such a space. Islamization is increasingly being pursued by
many Muslim regimes as a means of weakening the Islarnist challenge,
by conceding ground on issues of cultural representation, but keeping
Islam at bay from areas of public policy, international relations, and
economic affairs. Whereas Islamism seeks a radical transformation of
society, Islamization seeks to maintain the 'command heights' of the
status quo. Islarnization co-opts conservative Ulema and places the
burden of representing the Islamic identity of a polity not on the
regime but on those most sub-ordinated groups within society: women
and minorities. Thus, regulation of the behavior of these groups
becomes a marker of a community's Islamic identity. Islamization is
basically a depoliticization. It argues that the way to get a good society
is to have good individuals and good individuals come from the
cultivation of the self. So, it actually tries to reduce Islam to simply a
discipline for religious affirmation: you go to the inosque, you say your
prayers, you are more pious, more committed and by that process you
will then create a good society. Islamization is not the re-centering of
Islam in the public realm but the intensification of the hold of Islam in
the private sphere.
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dC: This separation of the public from the private or the political from
the religious seems to mirror the general modernist move that divides
all the world into distinctive and bounded spheres of social, political,
and economic relations. Are similar distinguishing moves being made
by Islamists? If so, which types of distinguishing moves are they
making?
SS: This, I think, is one of the most pressing questions for Islamists.
A lot of Islamists would argue that Islam is a total way of life and, as
such, it encompasses everything. However, the attempt to actually
concretize that total way of life is actually very limited. Islamists have
on the whole tended to neglect cultural production instead identifying
their platforms with cultural prohibitions. Thus, there are limited
lslamist attempts to develop a specific aesthetics or the full range of
cultural practices available to Islamicate civili~ation. One of ?1e
consequences of Islamists focusing on the Medina state and .seemg
subsequent Muslim history as a falling away fro~ that state, is. that
historical resources and achievements beyond this very exceptional
historical period of Islam during the Prophet's (p.b.u.h) rim~ rem~
unavailable to them. Thus, they are unable to have a conversation with
their past. Too often, too many Islamists give the impression ~at ~n
ideal Muslim subject is simply one who prays and carries out basic life
functions. That is it. S/he has no hinterland.
dC: What do you see as the relationship between the decentring of
European or Western hegemony and Islamism.

SS: I think the decentering of the West can be summarized as the
abandonment of a sequence which goes from Plato to NA!O· It
doesn't necessarily mean the abandonment of the contents which are
contained within that sequence, as you can rearticulate those .contents
with other kinds of sequences.
I would argue that without a
commitment to the de-centering of the West, the prospects for any
lslamist movement becoming hegemonic is limited. Thus, ~e
formation of Islamist hegemonies, and subsequently Isl~st
government, depends largely on their ability to include this de-coloru.al
moment (that is to build on the process of decentering of the West) m
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their horizons. To the extent that Islamists move away from the
decolonializing moment of the decentering of the West, the prospects
for an Islamist hegemony fade.

dC: In your book A F11ndamental Fear, Iran's Ayatollah I<homeini is a
significant figure in that he incorporates Wester~ notion~ of 'peopl~,'
'nation,' and 'state' into his political discourse while breaking the chain
of reference to Europe that is a crucial aspect of Eurocentrism. How
does this work? It is not as simple as just forgetting to mention the
Western heritage of some of these ideas, is it?
SS: Well, what is interesting is it's not I<homeini who said that the
genealogy of these concepts is a Western one. It is actually ami
Zubaida who is reading I<homeini and articulating that genealogy.
When Zubaida claims that he has recovered Western concepts like
'nation', 'people' and 'state' from I<homeini's A l-Ff11k11mah A!-Islam!Ja
(Islamic Government) his claim is not a product of excavanon but
rather an act of articulation which joins certain concepts like 'nas' to
'people' and locates the concept of 'people' in the Pl~to-to- AT
sequence. The identity of concepts comes not from their conte~t but
from their inclusion in specific chains of references. These chains of
references are socially constructed. There is no necessary link between
one element of the chain and the next. Not all articulations are equal,
some are institutionalized and sedimented- for many people, the
sequence Plato-to-NATO seems to be the 'natural' reporting of a real
state of affairs rather the contingent construction of a chain of
references over a period of ti.me. Zubaida gives the impression that he
sees in this sequence history not historiography.
The idea that certain elements possess a Western heritage is not an
intrinsic quality of those elements or an outcome of empirical
methodologies. What is considered to be part of or outside of the
Western heritage is a product of the construction of Western identity
through the articulation of particular chains of references.
For
example, one could imagine a different sequence which begins with
Aristotle and sees both Islam and the West not as two distinct cultural
formations but rather as part of a single 'post-Aristotelian' civilization.
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I<homeini, unlike many other thinkers associated with Islamism,
does not actually try to find a Western pedigree for his concepts, that is,
Zubaida has to do it for him. I<homeini's refusal to cite the Western
heritage is a major break with a past in which Muslim reformers have
constantly justified themselves by presenting their reforms as being
consistent with and legitimated by Western civilization. I<homeini's
rejection of such argumentation has two major consequences: firstly, it
refuses to privilege the West as the only source of the universal, and
secondly, it shifts the arguments for an Islamic order from an
instrumental to an ethical logic. For Khomeini, the establishment of
Islamic government is not necessary because such a government would
be better "in making the trains run on ti.me" (though it may do that),
rather an Islamic government has to be established because it is an
obligation for Muslims. To be a Muslim means living under an Islamic
government. In a sense, I<homeini's position echoes that ~aken by A~u
Bakr following the death of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) that being a Muslim
meant being a member of the Islamic state.
dC: Thinking about tl1e move of power that I<homeini makes ~aise.s a
couple of questions. I-low does one overcome that donunanng
discourse of scientific rationalization and justification? What happens
when one does make the sort of definitive statement that I<homeini
does? Is there a reversal of modernity's primary-secondary
categorization of science versus faith? In other words, does then faith
become a primary descriptor?
SS: It seems that opposition between faith and science may ?~ a
phenomenon that does not resonate among Muslims. The opposinon
between faith and science appears in the European context for set ~f
contingent historical reasons, and there is little reason to assume that it
can be simply extrapolated as a universal op~osition. Per~aps, one of
the reasons why the opposition between science and faith may not
operate in !v!uslim contexts is that in the Islamic concepti~n of the
Divine the gap between God and human cannot be clo.sed. Sa~nce ~s a
human activity cannot approach the Divine. The various soaologi~al
studies that have documented the over-representation of people with
scientific backgrounds within the various Islamist movements would
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seem to support the idea that an opposition between science and faith
is not necessarily a universal found in all cultural formations.
dC: One of the intellectual criticisms of the Western project is that it
contains a teleology whereby Europe itself becomes the end goal of its
own political vision of the world. We see this E uropean vision as being
derived from a Christian apocalyptic mentality. Is there a similar
teleological move or progressive moment that forms an important basis
of the Islamist political perspective?
SS: This is a very complex question. It turns upon two key points: the
relationship between religious eschatology and political teleology, and
the relationship between Islam and Islamism.
As you point out, within the Western project you see the reoccupation of Christian (theological) concepts during the progressive
secularization of Western culture. Thus, themes found in Christian
eschatology are also found in secularized discourses such as
communism. The effort of various political movements to replace
Christianity by inventing a secularized and 'rationalized' version is fairly
well documented. It was not only the Nazis and Communists but also
the Jacobians and Comtean positivists who sought to replace
Christianity with its secularized alter-ego.
Islamism is not a secularized attempt to replace Islam. The
relationship between Islam and Islamism is not that between religion
and ideology. Thus, Islamism cannot be understood as political
ideology based on the secularization of Islamic concepts. Islamism
reads Islam as being inscribed by the political from its foundation. This
can be confusing as it seems to be endorsing the Orientalist description
of Islam as being unable to distinguish between the religious and the
political. Such descriptions are invalid because they begin with
definitions of religion and politics as distinct spheres of human activity
which in deviant cases can become confused. Such arguments tend to
accept the Enlightenment definition of religion. If one does not think
that this definition of religion is universal, and thus, that religions that
do not conform to the pattern of Latin Christianity in specific periods
of its history, are still religions, then the question about the confusion
of religion and politics does not have the same scandalous force. The
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Islamist conception of Islam sees it as the foundation of an order- thus
1t is political by definition. According to Islamists, the correct
interpretation of Islam recognizes its political nature and builds upon it.
Having said that, I would like add that it may not be a bad thing to
be skeptical of the idea that the relationship between philosophical
roots and political practice is direct or transparent. Language and
philosophy are simply tools and humans use them depending on what
is necessary and what is needed. If they need a particular kind of word
or a particular kind of concept, they will find a way to come up with it.
One has to maintain a balance between recognizing a heritage which
people work through and coming to the conclusion that they can never
escape from or go beyond that heritage. I think \.ve're all working
through our past but all the time it is being transformed in that act of
working through.
dC: T hat speaks to me that in the process of encountering heritage,
especially in a colonized people, there are at least two heritages to draw
upon: the pre-colonial heritage and the heritage that comes from their
colonial existence. In your book, I think you mentioned the word
'hybrid' once and it's not usually used in this context. I was wondering
if that has something to do with the definition of the term 'hybridity' or
if it has to do with Islamism's privileging of the pre-colonial heritage
where most conceptualizations of hybridity privilege the European
heritage?
SS: It is the case, the imposition of colonial rule was very often
rxplicitly anti-Islamic. Partly, because in Asia and Africa European
colonists often confronted a Muslim ruling establishment-an
establishment they had to tame-and partly, it was a consequence of
the way in which European identity was historically based on an
antagonism towards Islam. One could imagine that Islamists would
tend to favor the pre-colonial over the colonial, for during the precolonial one could still conceive of Islamdom as having autonomy.
I would agree with you that many conceptualizations of hybridity
are conducted in the context of postcoloniality. Postcolonial clunkers
have attempted to overcome the West/ Rest colonial distinction by
valorizing hybridity, demonstrating that beyond the distinction of
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West/Rest, colonizers and colonized, was a complicated picture that is
belied by the purity of these bina1y oppositions. I would also agree that
construction of all identities is not a pure operation- in other words,
identities are formed by bringing together (articulating) constituent
elements under the domain of a particular signifier. Thus, for example,
the signifier "America" erases all its internal differences: when one
speaks of America in the moment one is neglecting the difference
between red states and blue states, between the West coast and East
coast between small town and big metropolitan areas .. . This is not
peculiar to the operation of the signifier "America." All ~ollecti~ties ~e
formed by similar acts of erasure. There is a paradoxical relat:ionship
between difference being necessary for the constitution of identity and
difference being the limit of the constitution of identity. This tension is
what is stabilized by the articulation of a signifier.
dC: Your book conveys a measured optimism about the decline of
Eurocentrism and the consequent possibility for different kinds of
politics to emerge in places like the Islamic world. Are there other
impediments that Muslims must overcome to realize such a possibility?

SS: The real issue for the Islamicate world is not a crisis of culture or a
crisis of theology or anything like that but is, to put it very bluntly, a
matter of political weakness. This answers the ques tion, Why aren't
Muslims more tolerant when they were tolerant in Andalusia?' or
whatever example you want to use. Muslims are politically weak in two
senses: they lack sufficient power to more or less control their destinies,
and they lack a degree of political consciousness that the gravity of their
situation perhaps warrants. As long as they remain politically weak,
their capacity to imagine something beyond the West will be restricted.
At the same time, as a consequence of history, all the major powers
of the world confront restive Muslim populations. They all seem to
have a "Muslim problem". Russia has a Muslim problem in Chechnya
which has caused something like a third of the Chechen population to
be killed or turned into refugees since Putin's war. The Indians have a
Muslim problem in I<ashmir (and within their own minorities). Indian
controlled I<ashmir is one of the most militarized places in the world
with some of the highest number of security personal per head of
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population. The Chinese have a Muslim problem in their 'wild wes.t'.
The Europeans have a Muslim problem in relation to the postcolorual
Muslim presence in their major conurbations. The Americans have
historically had a Muslim problem through Israel, but now they also
have a Muslim problem in their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. In
a sense, all the major powers have a convergence of interest dealing
with restless Muslim populations. This hampers political maneuvering
of Islamists- they can't really use one great power to maneuver against
another because it always means abandoning some Muslim group ...
diplomacy in this situation implies an accommodation with ~e
oppression of Muslims somewhere in the world. Thus, Islarrusts
attempting to use diplomacy often find themselves out-fl~nked by o~er
1slamist groups pointing to the abandonment of a Muslim populatt.on
as a consequence of making common ~ause with a. maj~r ?ower. I.f a
movement seeks an accommodation \.Vlth the Russians, tt ts forgettmg
about the Chechens. If it makes alliance with the Americans, it is
forgetting about the Iraqis or Palestinians. In the absence of such
diplomacy, the militarization of Islamism should not be such a great
surpnse.

dC: How much do you think the war on terror will be a force for
political unification within the Muslim world?
SS: I think it depends very much on how sustained the war .on terr.or is
and to what extent it continues to provide a means by which regunes
(Muslim and non-Muslim) are able to link their campaigns of
eradication of Islamists with the \var on terror'. These 'dirty wars' have
now been globalized under the rubric of the 'war against terror'-.-thus
many Muslims see tl1e 'war on terror' as being against Islamdom m one
way or another. If the 'war on terror' becomes a "permanent". fea~e
of the new world order an institution of a global 'dirty war', tts logic
'
.
.
.
will help to bring about a convergence among tts various. enemt~s .
Given that the 'war on terror' has a rather nebulous concept:ion of 1ts
enemy -easily slipping from radical Islamists to ordinary N1uslims, it. is
likely to enhance the process of politicization of the global Muslim
community. Aheady, we have seen ho\.v one of the consequence~ of
the 'war on terror' ts an increasing number of Muslims
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becoming politically conscious. In the UI<, for example, a large
proportion of the Muslim population participated ": ~on . s~on?
marches against the invasion of Iraq. For many Muslims 1n Britain, it
was the first time they had become involved in such demonstrations.
There are some indications that we are witnessing the emergence of a
distinct global Muslim public opinion in which corrunon narratives
regarding current affairs are beginning to circulate. For example'. ~e
anti-Zionist reading of the Israeli-Palestinian has become hegemoruc m
Muslim corrununities through the world. Similarly, the opposition to
American foreign policy is becoming increasingly widespread among
Muslims. The question is whether these translocal narratives will
enable ordinary Muslims to see the stories of their lives as part of the
larger canvas. The close association between repressive Muslim re~es
and the 'war on terror' risks thickening the belief among many Muslims
that the agents of their repression are not just their local tyrants but
also an 'international corrununity' which under the leadership of the
United States has become inherently anti-Islamic. Such a development
would mean that Muslims would see the travails of their lives as being
caused by the actions of specific governments rather than being the
natural state of affairs. Thus, the interpellation of ordinary Muslims
into the discourse generated by the global 'dirty war' would entail a leap
from the autobiographical to the historical. Such leaps are what
constitute political awareness. It is important to recall that such leaps
(from the autobiographical to the historical) had in the wake of the
collapse of the communism and the end of the Cold War become so
difficult to make, that many commentators saw in the end of the cold
war the end not only of geopolitical competition but the end of history
itself. The epistemological, economic and cultural domination of (neo)liberalism that occurred in the irrunediate aftermath of the Cold War
sought to present, as Bauman suggests, only biographical solutions to
social problems. The 'war on terror' has demonstrated that history has
not come to an end under the golden arches of McWorld.

SS: I think it is a very fair comparison. Islamophobia is--like anti.Semitism was during the period from 1885 to 1945--not confined to
fringe or marginal groups within society, but can be found in the banal
chatter of opinion makers, as well ordinary people. Many of the themes
of anti-Semitism are being re-deployed to describe Muslims, e.g.
notions of dual loyalty, Muslims as threats to the integrity of Western
c;ocieties ... For example, the decision to introduce legislation in France
banning the wearing of any religious symbols in public scho~ls was
initiated by and centered around concerns about the weanng ~f
headscarves by Muslim girls. Much of the debate around this
legislation denied all agency to Muslim women who w~re th~ hij.ab, in
favor of Orientalist fantasies in which these 'dusky' maidens 1Il distress
'
are rescued from their plight by the French Republic's Enlightenmentarmed white knights.
. .
But I would not want to give the impression that Islamophob1a 1s
solely a European phenomenon. I think it is far more prevalent and far
1nore institutionalized on both sides of the Atlantic than some people
arc prepared to recognize. It has been around in the United S.tates for a
number of years and has become increasingly widespread smce 2001.
It could be argued that the 'war on terror'-regardless of ~e
protestations of innocence by its instigators-furthers this
institutionalization. In the pursuit of this 'war,' governments
throughout the \.vorld have been responsible not only for ~e ero~ion of
civil liberties but also for the creation of a latent moral paruc which not
only permits' but encourages the continued expression of Islamophobia.

dC: While you were describing the Muslim world, it reminded me of
pre-Holocaust anti-Semitism in Europe. Is that a fair comparison?
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